Security of Tenure of Administrative Law Judges: How Much Can an ALJ Say and Still Stay an ALJ? by Shoenberger, Allen
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 4
10-15-1997
Security of Tenure of Administrative Law Judges:
How Much Can an ALJ Say and Still Stay an ALJ?
Allen Shoenberger
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
and the Judges Commons
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allen Shoenberger, Security of Tenure of Administrative Law Judges: How Much Can an ALJ Say and Still Stay an ALJ?, 17 J. Nat’l Ass’n
Admin. L. Judges. (1997)
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol17/iss2/4
SECURITY OF TENURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: HOW MUCH CAN AN ALJ SAY
AND STILL STAY AN ALJ?
Professor Allen Shoenberger*
Two somewhat conflicting decisions of United States Courts of
Appeals came out within a month of each other this summer regarding
the security of tenure of Administrative Law Judges. Roldan-Plumey
v. Cerezo-Suarez, 115 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997) concerned a suit brought
by a hearing examiner from a municipal regulatory agency, the
Commissioner of Municipal Affairs, the main regulatory agency for
municipalities in Puerto Rico. Latessa v. New Jersey Racing
Commission, 113 F.3d 1313 (3rd Cir. 1997) concerned the tenure of a
racing judge. Both decisions are interesting in their own right -
however the contrast between the decisions (neither referred to the
other) is also interesting.
Roldan was an hearing examiner in an agency charged with
uncovering, investigating and reporting to municipal mayors any
irregularities in the municipalities' management. In that agency certain
employees were classified as trust positions for purposes of the Puerto
Rico Public Service Personnel Act. ' When a governor was elected from
the New Progressive Party, a new Commissioner of Municipal Affairs
was appointed. A month later a new head was appointed to the legal
division, and one month after that Roldan received a letter dismissing
her effective that same date.
Litigation occurred in the context of a claim that in Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) the supreme court had held that
governmental employers may not discharge an employee because of
political party affiliation without showing a governmental interest that
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outweighed the employee's first amendment interest in association.
The plurality decision indicated that the government's interest could be
adequately served by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking
positions.2 A concurrence by Justice Stewart indicated that
nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential employees should not be discharged
on the basis of their political beliefs.
In subsequent decisions the court held that political affiliation
was not an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of an
assistant public defender. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). More
recently the impact of Elrod and Branti was extended to politically
motivated promotions, transfers, and recalls. Rutan v. Republican
Party of llinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), and for certain independent
entities who contract with the government (trash hauler, Board of
Commissioners, Waubansee County v. Unbeher, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (1996))
(tow truck operator, O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,
116 S.Ct. 2353 (1996)).
The First Circuit has adopted a two part test for discerning when
discharge based on political affiliation is permissible. First, do the
discharging agency's functions entail decision making on issues where
there is room for political disagreement on goals or their
implementation? If so, then the court determines whether the particular
responsibilities of the plaintiffs position, within the department or
agency, resemble those of a policymaker privy to confidential
information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose
function is such that party affiliation is equally appropriate requirement
for continued tenure. For the second prong, relative pay, technical
competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of
policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with
elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics and political
leaders are significant factors.
Roldan conceded the first prong of the test, i.e. That OCMA is
an agency whose functions require "decision making on issues where
2 Id. at 61.
Fal. 1997
there is room for political disagreement on goals or their
implementation."
However, the second prong was contested. The court looked to
duties inherent in the position, not actual functions of past or present
officeholders. The job description was considered the best, and
sometimes dispositive, source for determining the position's inherent
functions.
The job description for the Hearing Examiner detailed five
specific responsibilities as well as a designation to carry out other
assigned related duties. The five well defined responsibilities make
clear that the position of Hearing Examiner "leaves little room for free-
ranging actions independent of their limited scope. The narrow duties
require application of technical and professional skills in evaluating
facts and researching law. These duties are not broad and open-ended,
and do not leave room for discretionary policymaking or policy
implementation. Nor are they 'hazily defined.' the narrowly
circumscribed duties permit the officeholder the opportunity to identify
and investigate irregularities, but do not convey power or discretion to
take any action as a result of those findings."3
The court found the instant position more akin to that of an
internal auditor, addressed in Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1
(lst Cir. 1989) where the policy maker did not have to engage in
policymaking decisions, but instead required that the auditor investigate
the financial records of a municipality and make a report to the Mayor
and Comptroller. The auditor had no authority to correct the mistakes
that he was charged to investigate.4
The First Circuit denominated the Hearing Officer in the instant
case a mere "technocrat."5 After investigating and holding hearings, the
Hearing Examiner was charged with reporting to the Commissioner, in
whom authority rests to take action. The court considered that the five
31d. at 62.
4867 F. 2d at 17.
5115 F. 3d at 63.
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enumerated duties require technical and professional skills and no not
provide discretion to formulate or implement policy. Accordingly,
political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for the
position.'
Other indicia also were consistent with this determination. Thus
though the salary was the fifth highest of the 13 levels in the OCMA
pay scale, a significant number of employees may be paid more than the
Hearing Examiner. The trust classification also was fifth-tier, but
among 11 tiers. A law degree was not required, and no supervisory
responsibility went with the job. No public appearances or speeches on
behalf of the Commissioner went with the job. Contact with elected
officials only took place in the context of a hearing, and in no other
capacity does the Hearing Examiner act as a public spokesperson or as
a representative of the agency.7
The catch all category, "possibility of additional assignments
duty," was rejected as sufficient to distinguish this particular job as
policy related. Moreover, the few additional assignments actually
given to Roldan were not related to the Hearing Officer job
description.'
The court abjured a "modicum" of deference to the Puerto
Rico's legislature's designation of a particular position as "trust" or
"confidential." The narrow grant of power to designate no more than 25
employees in an agency as confidential was not adequately related to
the instant agency in which two tiers of secretaries and drivers were
labeled as trust or confidential employees, suggesting the category was
overly broad.9
The court then went on to deny a qualified immunity defense to
the defendants. The law may have been blurred at the edges, but the
court did not see the instant case as near that edge. The possibility
6Id. at 64.
7 Id.
8Id at 65.
9Id at 65
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might exist that at trial there could be a demonstration that the Hearing
Examiner's functions included following the course of legislation, and
providing legal assistance directly to the municipalities. Were such
functions to be demonstrated at trial, the issue of a qualified immunity
might again be raised. But summary judgment for the defendants on
this issue was inappropriate.' °
Contrast that decision with the third Circuit's decision in
Latessa v. New Jersey Racing Commission, 113 F.3d 1313 (1997).
There the court held that (1) the non reappointment did not result in
deprivation of the liberty interest of the judge in remaining free to work
as a racing judge, (2) the racing judge failed to demonstrate a property
interest in continued employment, (3) but that there was a genuine issue
as to whether non-reappointment was motivated by the judge's
protected testimony before the Office of Administrative Law on First
Amendment retaliation claims, and (4) that summary judgment was also
precluded on a claim that nonreappointment was in retaliation for
internal complaints about penalty adjudication procedure.
Latessa had been licensed the United States Trotting
Association as an Associate Judge with powers to officiate at harness
horse meets. He began working as a racing judge in 1985, and
continued through 1993. In New Jersey racing judges are appointed on
a meet by meet basis and serve at the pleasure of the Commission."
Penalty decisions are made in the first instance by certain
officials employed by the Commission, including panels ofjudges. The
Commission may then itself modify a penalty decision, and an appeal
may then lie to the Commission, which also has the power on its own
motion to reject or modify a penalty. Sometime in early 1993, Mr.
Zanzuccki (Executive Director of the N.J. racing Commission) and Mr.
Vukcevich (Deputy Director of the N. J. Racing Commission) began
making penalty "recommendations" in horse drugging case prior to the
formal action of the three judge panel appointed to take initial action in
the case.
01d. at 66.
113 F. 3d at 1316.
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In July 1993, Mr. Zanzuccki told Mr. Latessa that a 120-day
penalty should be imposed by a panel of judges that included Mr.
Latessa on a horse trainer accused of administering an illegal drug. Mr.
Latessa apparently didn't disagree, and told the other two judges about
Mr. Zanzuccki's statements, but the other judges decided otherwise,
believing the penalty would be inconsistent with penalties in other cases
and imposed a 90-day sentence. Latessa did not vote against this
result. 12
Zanzuccki was displeased and demanded reports from the three
judges as to what had happened. Each of the other judges described the
substance of their reasoning. Latessa described similar reasoning but
indicated he had been outvoted although he advocated Mr. Zanzuccki's
position. Follow up questioning of the other judges indicated that
Latessa's "advocacy" didn't go much beyond reporting Zanzuccki's
statement. 13
During the course of the summer of 1993 Mr. Zanzuccki
continued to make recommendations prior to hearings. Latessa
testified about this practice before the Office of Administrative Law
about this early intervention in the proceedings. Disagreements about
the treatment of the 90-day case continued in the fall. In November
Latessa testified to the Office of Administrative Law about the matter,
and on the following day, Zanzuccki sent a memorandum to the
Chairman of the N.Y. Racing Commission indicating he did not want
Latessa reappointed.'4
A week later the Administrative Law Judge credited Mr.
Latessa's testimony and issued an opinion critical of the actions of Mr.
Zanzuccki and his deputy. That opinion spoke of jeopardizing the
impartiality of the agency head - the NJRC- and that the procedure
make the proceedings before the OAL seem rather superfluous. "The
primary reason for establishing the [OAL] was to 'bring impartiality
and objectivity to agency hearings and ultimately to achieve higher
12Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
levels of fairness in administrative adjudications.""' 5 The agency head
was supposed to decide the case solely upon the record established at
the hearing. If the NJRC receives information from the Executive
Director or his deputy, it would be acting on information that neither
the opposing party nor the ALJ had an opportunity to consider. 6
The opinion also criticized the blending of functions within the
agency, for Latessa testified he felt he had no option but to follow the
recommendations on the proposed penalty. A licensee would
appropriately question the impartiality of such a procedure so
apparently lacking in fundamental due process. "[T]here is an (sic)
least an appearance of impropriety."' 7 Such a practice compromises
persons of high integrity, such as Latessa, who serve at the pleasure of
the NJRC.'"
Latessa brought suit against various parties including the NJRC,
Zanzuccki, and his deputy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon
deprivation of federal constitutional rights. First he alleged deprivation
of his 14th amendment due process liberty interest in remaining free to
work as a racing judge. Second, he alleged violation of his 14th
amendment due process property interest in the position of Presiding
Judge for the NJRC. Third, he alleged his free speech rights were
violated under the First Amendment.
The court rejected the liberty interest claim, asserting that the
liberty interest was not in a specific job. Since Latessa demonstrated
no attempts to secure such appointment except for his non-
reappointment at the Meadowlands, he failed as a factual matter to
create an issue that survived summary judgment.19
The court rejected the property interest claim, asserting that the
property interest in employment had not been demonstrated. Such a
15Id. at 1316.
16Id. at 1317
17Id.
18Mr. Latessa was not reappointed in 1994. 113 F. 3d at 1323.
19Indeed, Latessa indicated he worked for a short time as a judge in Maryland, but
found that employment unacceptable for geographical reasons.
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demonstration required a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a
unilateral expectation. It was undisputed that judges in N.J. work at the
pleasure of the Commission, and are paid on a weekly basis, with no
fringe benefits. Under the statute there is little to question that this was
at will employment. However, the court went further to analyze
whether there had been creation of a mutually explicit understanding
between the employee and employer that employment would be
continuous. Latessa indicated a triable fact existed in the instant case
because it was generally understood that if you kept you nose "clean"
and met expectations you would be generally reappointed. The court,
however, found that generalized statement inadequate either itself or
through minimal support in other depositions, to raise a factual question
on "tenure."
20
Thus the courts decision on these first two claims turned largely
upon the service at the pleasure of the Commission nature of the
judge's position.
However, the court reached different conclusions on the First
Amendment claims and reversed the grant of summary judgement on
both of the First Amendment claims to the Defendants.
The court analyzed the first Amendment claims under a three
step test: First, the plaintiff must prove that the speech was protected;
Second the plaintiff must show that the speech was a motivating factor
in the alleged retaliatory action; and, Third, the defendants may defeat
the plaintiff's claim by establishing that the adverse action would have
been taken even in the absence of the protected speech.2
The District Court had found the first prong of the test satisfied,
i.e. that the speech related to a matter of public concern, and not an
unrelated matter such as employment concerns of the individual
employee. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The Third Circuit
had already held that truthful testimony before a government body,
20113 F. 3d at 1318.
211d. at 1319.
whether under subpoena or not, was a matter of public concern.
22
A balancing test announced in Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) requires that the
expression "must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could
cause to the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. '"23
Thus the government must show that the public interest is outweighed
by the disruption.
The defendants asserted that Latessa was fired for "lying" in
conversation and memoranda, not because the testimony was likely to
be disruptive. 24 As such, the speech should be treated as unprotected.
The court determined that the combination of two facts, (1) that
Latessa had testified on the day prior to the first letter recommending
non-reappointment, and (2) that the replacement for Latessa had not
been determined upon prior to his testimony, made the issue incapable
of resolution as a matter of law. The defense of lying, could also be
viewed as mere pretext, i.e. was transmission of Zanzuccki's
recommendation by Latessa actual "advocacy" or simple transmission
of information.
Supporting the potential view that this was a pretextual reason,
was the fact that Latessa had served for many years without challenge
to his integrity. Moreover, Latessa was reappointed as Presiding Judge
for the fall meet a month after the incidents that allegedly indicated his
lack of integrity. The lack of any documentation prior to his testimony
of a decision not to retain Latessa, as well as the letter the day after his
testimony indicating that Zanzuccki sought the cooperation of the
Chairman of the NJRC indicate that the decision had not already been
made.25
22113 F.3d at 1319, citing Green v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 105 F.3d
882 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 64 (1997).
23113 F. 3d 1319.
2 4Id.25Id. at 1320.
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Thus a factual issue exists as to whether Latessa's testimony
contributed to the decision not to renew his employment.
The Third Circuit also rejected the Mt Healthy School District
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) alternative explanation
relied upon by the district court, that he would have been fired in any
event.26
The court was unclear as to whether Latessa contended that his
vote was itself protected speech, but does allege that the right to vote
freely in other cases was chilled by Zanzuccki's pressure. His concerns
about the procedure, the court ruled, were issues of public concern, but
not his generalized allegation that he could not vote as he wished.27
The objection about interference with penalty decisions was a
more substantial issue, even for those objections raised only internally
within the agency.28 Such internal expression may also be protected.
See, Connick v. Meyers. The issue was remanded to the District Court
to apply the three step analysis outlined above. (1) The defendants, for
example, had not alleged any disruption to the governmental functions
as a result of Latessa's objections. (2) The court found the balance of
interests unclear. (3) The District Court didn't address whether the
public concern portion of the internal speech, rather than the testimony
alone, was a motivating factor in non-reappointment.2 9
This decision, however, had attached to it a strong concurring
and dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Mansmann. 3' His disagreement
was with the First Amendment portions of the decision, for he found
adequate evidence to support a summary judgement in favor of the
defendants. While the details differ in a few matters, Judge Mansmann
simply found that there was enough demonstration through depositions
of Zanzuccki that a decision not to reemploy had been made sometime
26Id. at 132.1.
27Id.
28Id.
29Id. at 1321-22.
30Id. at 1322.
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in the early fall of 1993, sufficiently so as to make the Latessa's
testimony irrelevant.3 The dissenting judge didn't directly address the
internal complaint issue.
If one compares the treatment of the Assistant District
Attorney's questionnaire in Connick v. Meyers, as indicating her
personal interest in employment and not the public interest,32 it should
be clear that this is a narrow victory for Latessa. Only one question in
that ADA's questionnaire was treated as raising an interest of public
concern, the question was whether any other ADA's felt pressure to
work in political campaigns.2
However, Meyers's questionnaire was considered so disruptive
to the efficiency of the office so as to disrupt close working
relationships. 34 A wide degree of deference is due to such employer
judgements. Moreover, Meyer's raising of the issue ins the context of
a job reassignment that she did not like, tipped the balance against her
"public interest" assertion.35 Thus the public concern aspect of Meyer's
questionnaire which only in a most limited way turned upon an issue of
public concern, was overbalanced by the disruptive impact reasonably
believed to inhere in the situation by her employer.36
On the other hand, an off the cuff remark by a probationary
clerical employee in a county constable's office after an attempted
assassination of President Reagan, "If they go for him again, I hope
they get him, '37 did not justify dismissal. Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987). This remark constituted speech on a matter of public
concern.38  Moreover, the employee served no confidential,
policymaking or public contact role.39 The dissenting opinion thought
31Id. at 1325.
32461 U.S. at 148.
33461 U.S. at 149.
34461 U.S. at 151.
35461 U.S. at 153-4.36Only one of the four dissenting justices in Connick remains on the court.
37Even though McPherson could be dismissed for any reason or for no reason.
483 U.S. at 383.
38483 U.S. at 386.
39483 U.S. at 390-1.
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it inappropriate that a law enforcement employee could be permitted to
cheer for the bad guys, and the speech itself "so near the category of
completely unprotected speech"4 that it should not be permitted to
outweigh the interest of the employer against disruption.4"
Thus AL's speak, even internally, at their peril, particularly, as
in Latessa's case when no system of tenure exists. On the other hand,
there are serious threats that first amendment based causes of actions
exist against persons who rely upon speech as grounds for disciplinary
action. The practical burden is likely to be on the ALJ, however,
particularly if employment and salary is terminated. Alternative
employment may be hard to come by, or be "geographically
inconvenient" as it was for Latessa. Thus the rights recognized in these
two cases are quite tentative rights, rights not likely to reassure, but
rather perplex, a conscientious AL.
4°483 U.S. at 397-8.
41See also, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), (an employer may discharge
on the basis of what he reasonably believes was said, even if something else was said.
Caveat Orator).
